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Abstract 
This monograph describes research undertaken between 2015 and 2016 into factors 
precipitating involvement in organised crime in a conurbation in northern England. The 
research methodology consisted of six quantitative and qualitative elements. The 
researchers found that, while a small number of upper eschelon Organised Crime Group 
(OCG) nominals lived in comparative opulence, most were located in low income, high 
crime neighbourhoods, in which there was a tradition of organised criminality and 
violence. Their families were characterised by high levels of domestic violence. The 
research revealed that a multiplicity of agencies had intervened with these families, often 
to little effect, and the monogram concludes with recommendations concerning how 
policing and non-policing agencies might work together more effectively to reduce both 
familial and criminal violence. 
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Introduction 
The attempt to articulate the policing of organised crime with the work of other public and 
voluntary sector bodies is in line with the public sector reforms currently underway. It 
marks a recognition that in an era of dwindling public sector budgets all public and 
voluntary sector agencies need to explore the most cost-effective means of achieving 
their goals. This is the context for the present research and this is why the research 
focuses on how the actions of one police service in a northern conurbation might mesh 
more effectively with the efforts of agencies working with families with ‘complex 
dependencies’. This research therefore aims to identify effective models of collaborative 
working to prevent involvement in organised crime  
Methodology 
The research methodology consisted of six elements: 
1. A desk-based review of the relevant research on pathways into organised crime, 
organised crime careers and intervention with individuals and families associated 
with Organised Crime Groups (OCGs). 
2. An analysis of the scale and nature of the problem of OCG involvement in the 
northern conurbation, utilising quantitative data held by the police. 
3. A comparative study of the criminal career trajectories of OCG- and non-OCG-
involved offenders in an area of the conurbation. 
4. Qualitative interviews with a purposive sample of incarcerated OCG affiliates from 
the conurbation. 
5. A review of relevant information held by public agencies that currently have, or 
have had, contact with families, one or more of whose members are associated 
with OCGs in the area, via attendance and participant observation at the Systems 
Thinking Workshops convened by the police in five areas within the conurbation. 
The researchers also undertook interviews with previous participants in workshops 
in five other ares in the conurbation in which the researchers had been unable to 
participate. 
  The principle aims of the Systems Thinking Workshops were to: 
I.) Explore the routes into organised crime and the system conditions that 
allow such involvement. 
II.) Identify early intervention opportunities to prevent involvement in, or 
promote desistance from, organised crime. 
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III.) Examine how public agencies can work together most effectively to prevent 
involvement or promote desistance from involvement in organised crime. 
6. Key Informant Interviews with respondents who are ‘key’ in the sense that they 
can facilitate access to the extensive social networks to which they are 
‘gatekeepers’ and provide unique understandings of aspects of their social milieu, 
by dint of the roles they play or have played within it, and illuminate the meanings 
of behaviour that the researcher may not understand. As such, these key 
informants who were senior members of relevant agencies and organisations in 
the police area were able to extend the researchers understanding of situations 
where he or she could not be a direct observer.  
Organised Crime: Messages from the Research 
There are many definitions of organised crime and the term is applied to a broad range of 
unrelated groupings and activities. The term can be used to refer to certain types of 
sophisticated criminal activities in illicit markets, but these can also be described as 
‘professional crime’. In reality these illicit markets range from large, hierarchical 
organisations like Mexican drug cartels or the Italian ‘mafia’, through relatively small, 
loosely connected, sometimes temporary, local networks, to adolescent street gangs. It is 
therefore difficult to arrive at a precise definition but for a comprehensive list of over 150 
definitions of ‘organised crime’ see Klaus von Lampe’s 2013 compilation. As Albanase 
(2000) has observed: 
It appears that a definition of organised crime, based on a consensus of writers 
over the course of the past three decades, would read as follows: Organised crime 
is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities; 
its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly 
control, and/or the corruption of public officials.  
In this research we have adopted the definitions utilised by the Home Office in its Local to 
Global: Reducing the Risk from Organised Crime publication (Home Office, 2013): 
 Individuals, normally working with others, with the capacity and capability to 
 commit serious crime on a continuing basis, which includes elements of planning, 
 control and coordination, and benefits those involved. A significant proportion of 
 organised criminals are motivated, principally, by the desire to make money. 
 Others, such as the perpetrators of organised child sexual exploitation, have 
 different motivations.  
In its Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (Home Office, 2013), HM Government notes 
that: 
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 Organised crime includes drug trafficking, human trafficking, and organised 
 illegal immigration, high value fraud and other financial crimes, counterfeiting, 
 organised acquisitive crime and cyber crime. The strategy also deals with serious 
 crime which demands a national coordinated response, notably other fraud and 
 child sexual exploitation.  
In the northern conurbation, organised crime takes many different forms, including loan 
sharking, prostitution, child sexual exploitation, the production and distribution of 
counterfeit goods, the sale and distribution of stolen goods and protection rackets 
involving the domination of local pubs and entertainment venues; sometimes 
accompanied by intimidation of local residents and, of course, drug trafficking and drug 
dealing.  
Indeed, the drugs trade in all its manifestations is the motor of much of the violence, 
burglary, robbery and vehicle crime in the region. Thus far however, it has not been 
possible to identify a clear link between the drug trafficking activities of OCGs and drug 
dealing street gangs. Project crime, in the form of high value robberies or the theft of 
expensive cars for export, perpetrated by local criminals, but also criminals from beyond 
the region, are another significant feature of the organised crime landscape in the 
conurbation.     
Organised Crime and Organised Criminal Careers 
At present our knowledge of careers in organised crime is limited. Most of what we know 
is derived from studies of the aetiology of child and adolescent offending and life-course 
studies of troubled and troublesome children and young people, like those undertaken by 
Sampson & Laub (1993, 2003).  
However, the ‘criminal careers’ paradigm is based on longitudinal, prospective methods 
applied to general populations of children and families. Typically, research subjects are 
selected as children in a ‘pre-crime’ state, and then followed through their life-course in 
an attempt to establish which pre-crime ‘risk factors’ correlate with, and make it possible 
to predict, the nature and persistence of their subsequent criminal careers (Farrington, 
2012). This research identifies two main career ‘pathways’; ‘adolescence time-limited’ 
which characterises the bulk of offenders while ‘lifecourse-persistent’ pathways 
characterise a minority. Serious violent criminals tend to be located in the latter group. 
‘Late-onset’ offending is rare but as research undertaken in the Netherlands and the UK 
indicates, ‘late onset’ offenders are more likely than other groups to be involved in 
organised crime (Kleemans E. & de Poot F., 2008, Kleemans E. & van de Bunt, H. 2008, 
van Koppen, et al, 2010).  
Organised crime typically involves adults. Involvement may be the outcome of a 
‘lifecourse-persistent’ criminal career or it may, as we have noted, begin in adulthood. 
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Kleemans and de Poot (2008) found that one in three organised crime ‘nominals’ had no 
involvement with the judicial system prior to the organised crime index case. On average, 
offenders were aged 27 when they first became involved with the judicial system and 37 
at the time of the organised crime index case. Similarly, in their study of over 4000 
offenders involved in offences which suggested some involvement in organised crime in 
the UK, primarily drug trafficking, Francis (et al, 2013) found that offenders who followed 
the more conventional pattern of offending, peaking in late teenage years before rapidly 
declining, made up less than one in five (18%) of their sample. The offences they 
committed required some specialist skill, significant resources, reliable contacts and 
organisational acumen. Unsurprisingly, therefore ‘late onset’ offenders, with relevant 
skills, often developed in legitimate business enterprises, were heavily represented. 
Kleemans and de Poot (2008) analysed the careers of 66 ‘nodal offenders’, whom they 
describe as: 
... main suspects who fulfilled an executive function in the criminal groups or 
criminal networks in the index cases. These offenders were, on average, 39 years 
old at the time of the index case, had 12 previous contacts with the criminal justice 
authorities and were, on average, 23 years old at the time of their first contact with 
these authorities.  
However, also in this group were 30 ‘lifecourse-persistent’ offenders whom Kleemans & 
de Poot refer to as ‘local heroes’ because they had strong local roots and social contacts 
which enabled them to become involved in a variety of legal and illegal activities. These 
‘local heroes’ seldom wanted to extend their operations beyond their own region and they 
lacked the skills or expertise that would make them attractive to organised criminals from 
other regions or countries. Nonetheless, in some cases assets gained through local 
burglaries and robberies were used to negotiate the transition into organised crime. In 
some cases, the shift into narcotics saw a reduction in their ‘judicial contact’ since they 
were then involved in less detectable crime. Where they did come to official notice, it was 
usually as a result of violent crime or traffic violations. 
Pathways into Organised Crime 
The research suggests two, quite distinct, pathways into two different levels of organised 
crime. For ‘late onset’ OCG members life events, particularly those associated with debt 
and bankruptcy, often trigger involvement in organised crime (Kleemans and de Poot, 
2008). ‘Late onset’ adult offenders with no appreciable previous criminal record tended to 
become involved when opportunities, particularly those which arose in their day-to-day 
work, presented themselves. 
Adult ‘starters’ in organised crime often possessed specific skills, characteristically in the 
transport industry, import/export, customs, financial and legal advice, tax administration, 
law, foreign exchange, banking, and independent entrepreneurism. Contacts with other 
10 
 
suspects were often made through work but occupational contacts also coincided with 
social relations. In some cases the illegal activities were completely intertwined with their 
legitimate business activities. It seems that once embarked upon their illicit career paths, 
subjects would often involve family members and friends and, inasmuch as adults might 
recruit their children and partners, it was also the case that their grown-up children might 
involve their parents. Social ties and the concomitant transfer of knowledge and contacts 
tended to create a social snowball effect which meant that as subjects proceeded in their 
life of crime, their dependence on the resources of their initial contacts declined and they 
found their own criminal associations.  
This challenges the traditional idea of recruitment and progression up the criminal career 
ladder as subjects prove they are able to handle the requirements of the job, although in 
some cases organised crime groups did set out to recruit individuals with specific skills 
and knowledge, but deliberate recruitment appears to be exceptional. In the conclusion to 
their report, Francis (et al, 2013) noted that: 
The existence of a large group of offenders whose involvement in organised crime 
begins in adulthood, and often without a clear pattern of prior offending, is 
intriguing and one worth further investigation. Establishing to what extent these 
offenders were simply more adept at avoiding detection, or whether their 
involvement in organised criminality in later life was more opportunistic would be  a 
central question to address.  
Organised Crime and the Family 
In the other group of OGC members are ‘life-course-persistent’ offenders many of whom 
were seriously violent teenagers. This pattern also emerges from our analysis of the 
quantitative data held by the police and the Case Control Study undertaken in one area 
of the conurbation. The findings from extensive longitudinal research into ‘life-course 
persistent’ offenders suggests that the familial pre-crime ‘risk factors’ to which these 
OGC members were subjected to in childhood are good predictors of adult criminality 
(Farrington et al, 2009).  
Organised Crime and the Neighbourhood Effect 
The police data also shows that these families, and their offending, tend to be 
concentrated in particular geographical areas and that their violence is likely to be both 
expressive (related to lifestyle) and instrumental (committed in furtherance of a criminal 
enterprise). This raises important questions about the impact of violence upon the 
families of OCG members and violent, localised, criminal (sub) cultures upon the children 
and adolescents who live in these neighbourhoods.  
Certain notorious ‘criminal families’ in the area where our case-control study was 
undertaken, for example, appear to foster successive generations of new recruits who 
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sustain the criminal networks in their communities. These kinds of familial networks are 
deeply embedded in communities characterised by limited legitimate opportunity, 
alternative economies, unorthodox methods of informal social control and values which 
are often at odds with those of the mainstream. The criminologist Edwin Sutherland 
(1947) argued that individuals learn the motives, values, attitudes, and techniques 
favourable to criminality through association with those who already hold and practice 
them. His theory of Differential Association predicts that an individual will opt into 
criminality when the balance of definitions favourable to law-breaking exceeds those 
favourable to being a law-abiding citizen. Moreover, the earlier in life that this association 
begins, the greater the intensity of the association and the higher the status of those 
transmitting the motives, values, attitudes, and techniques, the stronger will be the 
subject’s commitment to criminality. When these behaviours and attitudes are 
consistently rewarded within a particular social milieu, Sutherland argues, criminality is in 
effect normalised. 
Pierre Bourdieu (1993) describes such milieu as Social Fields which, he says, are 
shaped by both the broad ‘determining structures’ of class, family, ethnicity, and 
education and local social, cultural, and economic imperatives. Prestige within a social 
field is ascribed to those who conform to its norms, values, and social mores. As Max 
Weber observes: 
status honour is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style 
of life can be expected from those who wish to belong to the circle. 
                (1958, p. 187)  
Bourdieu suggests that one’s position in a social field induces a set of motivations that 
are experienced as “what should be done”. Thus, what Bourdieu calls the social fate of 
individuals is sealed in large part by the role demands, which they experience as a chain 
of objective requirements placed upon them. As one of Harding’s respondents said of his 
involvement with a violent street gang in Lambeth: 
You learn it just by hanging around. ... You know what you are supposed to do 
and not supposed to do really. Just like what you are allowed to do at school. They 
don’t even need to explain it’. 
         (Harding, 2014) 
This being so, in considering an intervention that would address the pressures towards 
criminal involvement in these neighbourhoods, one would need to consider the individual, 
the individual within the family, and the family and the individual within their social field. 
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Organised Crime and Street Gangs 
One of the main differences between street gangs and OCGs has been that while many 
OCGs have been wholesalers, trafficking large quantities of illicit drugs, street gangs 
were essentially retailers dealing relatively small amounts ‘on the street’. However, 
respondents interviewed in the recent independent evaluation of the government’s 
Ending Gang and Youth Violence (EGYV) programme (Disley & Liddle, 2015) suggest 
that the dividing line between street gangs and OCGs is becoming increasingly blurred 
and that in two London boroughs, Barking & Dagenham and Greenwich, the street gangs 
have effectively evolved into OCGs, involved in both wholesale and retail illicit drug 
supply. Other respondents felt that in Manchester the success of the Manchester Multi 
Agency Gangs Strategy (MMAGS) and the Xcalibre police gangs team had meant that a 
few older gang affiliates had migrated to OCGs while in Birmingham a reduction in gang 
activity and territorial violence had paralleled an increase in wholesale drug dealing 
which, they suggested, reflected a similar trend. It appears that street gangs are now 
operating on a broader terrain. New alliances formed as a result of gang members being 
moved via Safe & Secure programmes or new relationships developed between 
members of different gangs from different parts of the country while they are in jail or 
Young Offenders Institution (YOI) are a key factor in ‘cross-border collaboration’ to 
distribute drugs. One respondent suggested that one of the results of this was a 
‘loosening of gang affiliations’ to enable affiliates to conduct business more efficiently; 
which meant dealing with people from a multiplicity of gangs. The authors observe that 
because OCGs are less visible than street gangs and OCG members are less likely to be 
apprehended, it could be the case that an apparent reduction in gang activity is being 
paralleled by an escalation in OCG activity.  
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Research Findings 
A Profile of Organised Crime Groups in the Conurbation 
Nationally, policing agencies classify OCGs on an Organised Crime Group Map (OCGM). 
This matrix has two axes; Criminal Impact and Criminal Capability.  
Criminal Impact, measured on a scale of 1 to 5, refers to both the value of the proceeds 
from criminal activity and the impact upon the victims.  
Criminal Capability measured on a scale of A to C refers to the capacity of OCGs to 
organise and articulate networks, the most sophisticated of which link international, 
regional, and local OCG activity.  
Three of the respondents interviewed in the OCG prisoner study undertaken as part of 
the present research were senior figures in high capability/high impact OCGs. At the 
other end of the scale are local OCGs characteristically composed of family members 
and their associates, involved in local drug distribution, loan sharking, protection rackets, 
or car ‘ringing’. Thus OCGs can be ranked along a continuum which stretches from 1A, 
representing the greatest capability and the highest level of impact, to 5C; those OCGs 
with least criminal impact and lowest capability. 
Data held by the police indicated that in February 2015 there were 198 active OCGs in 
the conurbation and a further 128 deemed to be no longer active. This suggests, as 
Hobbs and Dunningham (1998) have observed, that the organised crime landscape is 
changing and while dynastic, familial, and territorial groupings remain, exemplified by the 
Adams Family in London and the Noonans in Manchester, today local organised crime is:  
 ... a mixed economy of embedded familial crime ‘dynasties’, virtual networks, as 
 in the case in Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) rings and ‘project’ crime; 
 temporary collaborations between specialist professional criminals, in which 
 the link between territorial control and market sovereignty is attenuated, as 
 the neighbourhood is to some extent supplanted by the market as the major 
 field of operation  
        (Hobbs & Dunningham, 1998)  
OCGM data held by the police in the conurbation indicates that, in terms of Criminal 
Capability, 75% of currently active OCGs can be categorised at level 4 or below. The fact 
that 39% of this group score, a high A or a B on Criminal Impact, is accounted for by their 
use of, sometimes extreme, violence in pursuance of their nefarious activities. Data from 
different sources, including the prison interviews and the Systems Thinking Workshops, 
suggests that members of this group are disproportionately likely to be involved in 
domestic violence and that their children are at greater risk of physical harm within the 
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home. This is the group which one Workshop participant referred to as ‘disorganised 
criminals involved in organised crime’ and these OCG members tend to live in high 
crime, low income neighbourhoods where the lives of many OCG-involved families are, 
as one Key Informant observed, ‘chaotic’.  
According to their classification on the OCG matrix, these groupings appear to be 
relatively fluid and unstable, while their members, although committing serious offences, 
make relatively little overall criminal impact. This grouping contains both discreet low 
level OCGs and the, often casual, ‘workforce’ of upper echelon organised crime; 
engaged in low skilled, usually violent activity (the ‘muscle’) in support of upper echelon 
groups. These OCGs and the ‘middle range’ group (OCGs ranked 4C to 3A) were most 
prevalent in the area of our Case Control Study. 
These groups are likely to contain a preponderance of ‘early onset’, ‘lifetime persistent’ 
offenders and what Kleemans & Poot (2008) refer to as ‘local heroes’. These are people 
whose families will have had, sometimes extensive, contact with criminal justice, health 
and social welfare agencies although, as the Systems Thinking Workshops revealed, 
professionals from these latter agencies may not be aware of their criminal involvement 
or the potential threat that they might pose. 
As the table below indicates most of the roles played within OCGs are associated with 
the trafficking, supply, and cultivation of illicit drugs. The cultivators, chemists, suppliers, 
and organisers comprise just over two thirds (70%) of the OCG ‘nominals’ known to the 
police in the conurbation. The ‘not known’ category, probably includes those involved in 
loan sharking, protection rackets, or car ringing but many of these may also play a role 
within the drugs business, protecting the drugs and enforcing drug debts. If we assume 
that much of the money laundered by OCG nominals is derived from drug sales we could 
add up to a further 4% to the total of drug-related OCG roles. It appears that the illicit 
drugs trade constitutes the ‘lion’s share’ of the organised crime problem in the 
conurbation, suggesting that any local drug strategy would need to target OCGs.  
Table 1: Roles Played by OCG Nominals 
Role Percentage (%) 
Supplier (Drugs) 43 
Organiser 21 
Not Known 17 
Cash Consolidator/Collector 5 
Burglar 4 
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Money Launderer 4 
Chemist/Cultivator 2 
Courier 1 
Other Roles 3 
Total 100 
The Case Control Study  
The purpose of the Case Control Study was to explore pathways into organised crime. 
The research team employed a ‘case-control’ research strategy wherein each OCG 
nominal in the chosen area was matched with a non-OCG offender from amongst the 
local population. In this way it was possible to establish the key differences between the 
criminal careers of OCG members who were similar in most other respects to their local 
non-OCG criminal peers. This method is used extensively in epidemiological studies in 
public health. All the ‘cases’ selected were currently active OCG ‘nominals’ in the area.  
This analysis enabled the research team to produce a local ‘organised crime map’ which 
highlighted the characteristics of all the OCG nominals in the area. These nominals are 
recorded by the police as groups of associates and placed on the police OCG Tracker. 
The analysis revealed that many of the characteristics of the OCG case control cohort 
are more akin to those of the ‘local heroes’ identified by Kleemans and de Poot (2008) 
than the ‘late onset groups’ discussed above.  
There were 50 active members of OCGs in the Tracker sample for the area, aged 
between 17 and 55. 92% of them were white and they were all prolific offenders, 
generating between them 1,452 lifetime offences to date, an average of 29.04 per 
offender (see Table 2 below). Their offences cover a wide range and include the most 
serious violent offences (HO Codes 1 to 5, including murder, attempted murder, 
manslaughter and conspiracy to murder).  
Table 2: Offences Committed by OCG Nominals 
Lifetime Offences N Percent 
Serious violence 1452 6.61 
Violence 1452 10.40 
Sexual offences 1452 0.55 
16 
 
Burglary 1452 13.00 
Robbery 1452 12.00 
Handling 1452 31.00 
Domestic abuse 1452 2.00 
Guns used 1452 3.00 
Alcohol influence 1452 3.00 
Other 1452 27.00 
 
Eighty six percent of the OCG sample received their first conviction as juveniles and 
might therefore be regarded as ‘Lifetime Persistent’ although their frequency of offending 
decreases in their 20s. However, this may well be attributable to them being 
incarcerated. The lower frequency of offending amongst the 22 to 29 age group, 
compared with those over 30, would suggest that this is the case and support the view 
that these are lifetime persistent offenders who, unlike their non-OCG counterparts, do 
not ‘age-out’ of criminal involvement.  
A Comparison of OGC and Non-OGC ‘Controls’  
This analysis compares the criminal careers of members of OCGs in area of the 
conurbation with those of local non-OCG offenders on the basis of ethnicity, age, and 
age at first offence. The analysis aims to establish how the nature and frequency of their 
offending differs over time from that of the non-OGC comparison group. The analysis 
reveals that OCG members have a distinctive pattern of offending.  
The OCG group are particularly prolific young offenders but as they grow-up they tend to 
specialise in instrumental violence in pursuance of various forms of acquisitive crime. 
Their non-OCG peers by contrast tend to specialise in non-violent property crime and 
‘expressive’ violence associated with heavy drinking and substance abuse. OCG 
members are convicted less frequently in adulthood, although it is not clear whether this 
is because they specialise in forms of organised crime that are harder to detect, or 
whether, because their offending is more serious, they are incarcerated for longer 
periods. 
As juveniles (below the age of 18 years) the OCG members offended much more 
frequently than their non-OCG contemporaries and were over three times as likely to be 
convicted of a ‘violent’ crime or a ‘very serious’ violent crime (including murder). They 
were also significantly more likely to be convicted for robbery, theft, dishonestly handling, 
17 
 
and fraud. Interestingly, given the relative profligacy of their offending, they were less 
likely to be convicted for an offence in which guns were used. 
This higher frequency of offending continues into their early 20s and their rate of 
convictions for ‘very serious’ violent crime actually increases. They are however, 
considerably less likely than the non-OCG cohort to be convicted for offences involving 
domestic abuse. Given their known penchant for violence, however, this finding could be 
attributable to the fact that partners were unwilling to report these offences. Evidence 
from the Systems Thinking Workshops (see below) and data from Wilson and Klein’s 
(2006) seven year study of offenders’ involvement in domestic abuse tend to support this 
view.  
As we have indicated, in their mid to late 20s OCG nominals appear to offend less 
frequently but they are still twice as likely to be convicted for robbery and over three 
times as likely to be convicted for ‘very serious’ violent crime than their non-OCG 
counterparts. An emerging characteristic, evident in their late 20s and 30s, is that OCG 
nominals are a lot less likely to be convicted for alcohol-related offences. 
In their 30s OCG members appear to offend less frequently but, for reasons that are 
unclear, are almost certain to be convicted for firearms offences.  
The main factor that singles out the OCG cohort is their involvement in ‘serious’ and ‘very 
serious’ violence. This violence, especially the ‘very serious’ violence starts at an 
unusually young age and continues over the life course. A substantial body of research 
identifies two different developmental trajectories for the emergence of youth violence, 
one characterized by the ‘early onset’ of violence and the other by ‘late onset’. Children 
who commit their first serious violent act before puberty are in the early-onset group, and 
this violence is likely to persist into adulthood, whereas young people who do not become 
violent until adolescence, the late-onset group, are usually responding to pressures in 
their immediate environment and will tend to ‘age out’ of violent crime.  
North American research indicates that between 20% and 45% of boys who are serious 
violent offenders by age 16 or 17 initiated their violence in childhood (D'Unger et al., 
1998; Elliott et al., 1986; Huizinga et al., 1995; Nagin & Tremblay, 1999; Patterson & 
Yoerger, 1997; Stattin & Magnusson, 1996). A higher percentage of girls who were 
serious violent offenders by age 16 or 17 (45 to 69 percent) were violent in childhood 
Most violent young offenders only begin their violent behaviour during adolescence and 
this suggests that it may be possible to identify serious violent offenders who persist into 
adulthood in early childhood (Lipsey & Derzon, 1998). Early onset violent offending is a 
strong predictor of ‘lifetime persistent’ violent offending and is closely associated with the 
following range of ‘pre-crime’ risk factors. Farrington (2012): 
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 Families characterised by high levels of conflict 
 Early and persistent exposure to violence in the home  
 Anti-social parents who are hostile to authority figures 
 Parental and/or fraternal criminality 
 Poor child-rearing practices 
 Child abuse 
 Large family size 
 Early pregnancy 
 Low socio-economic status  
 Impulsiveness 
 Low school attainment 
 
These risk factors are often inter-related so that young single parents on low incomes 
experience high rates of depression which undermine their parenting capacity and 
impacts upon the behaviour of their children and their attainment in school. Similarly, 
living in a home where conflict is resolved through violence and attitudes to authority 
figures i.e. teachers, social workers and the police are hostile will suggest  to the child 
that violence and hostility are a legitimate means of getting what they want. 
 
In the OCG cohort on the police database, particular familial factors stand out and could 
well prove to be the most reliable predictors of future OCG involvement and involvement 
in violent crime in particular. The problem here is not neglect or abuse per se, but 
parental criminality, hostility to authority figures and exposure to violence in the home.  
The Cambridge Study of Delinquent Development (Farrington et al, 2009) found that 
having a convicted parent or elder sibling before a male child’s 10th birthday was among 
the best predictors of offending up to the age of 32. At age 40, convictions were heavily 
concentrated amongst those for whom this was the case. While only 6% of the families in 
this study had this characteristic, they accounted for half of all convictions. 
As we have noted, it appears that in the case of OCG members criminality is transmitted 
from generation to generation via a process of ‘differential association’ (Sutherland, 
1947). These effects will be compounded by the child witnessing parental conflict, 
domestic violence and living through a fractious divorce or separation. If, as we have 
suggested, this is not simply a feature of individual households but a characteristic of 
family life in particular neighbourhoods characterised by a distinctive, ‘oppositional’ sub-
culture, the child will grow up in a social environment which is supportive of anti-social, 
illegal and violent behaviour. 
However, we should sound a note of caution here because risk factor analysis tends to 
over-predict involvement when it fails to consider the processes or developmental 
pathways that intervene between risk factors and outcomes (Boeck et al, 2006). In 
reality, subtle differences in initial conditions may, over time, produce remarkably 
different outcomes meaning that children initially deemed to be ‘at risk’ in similar ways 
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embark upon different criminal pathways while some ‘high risk’ children do not go on to 
offend at all. (Farrington 2012). This gives some cause for optimism because the 
proverbial ‘difference that makes a difference’ could be interventions from agencies, 
organisations, and individuals which offer different attitudes and aspirations and 
pathways for their achievement. 
Interviews with Incarcerated OCG Members 
Because the aim of the present research is to identify key points of intervention in the 
criminal careers of subjects involved in organised crime, it was decided that the analysis 
of quantitative data held by the police and the Case Control Study should be 
complemented by qualitative data gleaned from interviews with members of OCGs. 
Existing studies of organised crime careers are based largely on analyses of the case 
files of individuals and groups of offenders involved in ‘transit crimes’; those offences 
which involve transporting illicit goods or people across national and international 
boundaries. These studies seldom involve qualitative interviews with members of OGCs 
because, as Geoffrey Pearson and Dick Hobbs (2001) have observed, it is difficult to 
gain access to, and elicit accurate information from, people who are actively engaged in 
the middle and upper echelons of organised crime in general and class A drug 
distribution in particular. They write: 
The use of ethnographic methods is rarely feasible in the study of upper and 
middle level trafficking owing to the degrees of secrecy and security that are 
employed 
       (Pearson & Hobbs, 2001)  
As a result, the few qualitative studies that do exist, mainly conducted in the USA with 
members of the Italian mafia, have tended to rely upon the testimony of convicted, and 
normally imprisoned, respondents.  
Contact was made with prisons in which OCG members from the conurbation were 
inmates. Over 40 letters were sent to potential respondents. Ten replies were received, 
two of which explained that they were unable to participate in the research. One, 
because, ‘being innocent’, he felt that participation might suggest that he was in fact 
guilty, while the other said he feared that participation might suggest to other prisoners, 
on the high security wing where he was being held, that he was an informer. A further 
problem was that the remaining respondents had been dispersed to different prisons 
across the North West, the West and East Midlands, and East Anglia and information 
about the dates and times of the interviews had not always got through to those 
responsible for security at these prisons, meaning that the researchers were prevented 
from undertaking interviews. Eventually, with the help of the regional crime unit, the 
researchers were able to gain access to nine OCG nominals in four jails in the North 
West, one of whom (Respondent I) withdrew at the point of interview.  
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Table 3: Offences for which Respondents were Imprisoned 
The Respondents 
Respondent A 45 Fraud 
Respondent B 53 Drug Trafficking/Money Laundering 
Respondent C 40 Drug Trafficking 
Respondent D 61 Drug Trafficking 
Respondent E 25 Drug Trafficking 
Respondent F 27 Armed Robbery 
Respondent G 31 Drug Trafficking 
Respondent H 27 Drug Trafficking 
Respondent I 25 Drug Trafficking 
 
The research strategy of ‘purposive sampling’ was adopted partly because of the 
difficulty of finding respondents but largely because we were aware of the characteristics 
of the population to be researched and sampling for proportionality was not a concern. 
The main goal of purposive sampling is to focus on particular characteristics of a 
population that are of interest and which will best enable us to answer questions about 
them.  
The researchers used a semi-structured interview schedule which, while pursuing the 
same themes in the same order with each respondent, was sufficiently open to allow new 
ideas to be introduced during the interview in response to what interviewees said, rather 
than relying only on concepts and questions defined in advance of the interview. 
Themes Emerging from the Prison Interviews 
While all of the respondents had been found guilty of involvement in organised crime, the 
roles they played, and the length of the sentences they were serving varied widely. What 
follows is a thematic analysis of the responses of the respondents involved in the 
research process.  
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Age of Involvement in Organised Crime 
As we have noted, criminological research identifies two main criminal career pathways; 
‘adolescent time-limited’ which characterises the bulk of offenders and ‘lifecourse-
persistent’ which characterises a minority. However, given the relative youth of most 
respondents it was difficult to say whether or not they would be ‘lifetime persistent’ so we 
have referred to them here as ‘early onset’. ‘Late-onset’ offending is rare but as research 
indicates, ‘late-onset’ offenders are more likely to be involved in organised crime and four 
of our respondents fell into this category (Farrington, 2012, Kirby & Penna, 2011, Kirby & 
Nailer 2013, Kleemans & de Poot 2008).  
Early Onset Criminality 
Respondent E was brought up on a notorious housing estate in a Northern city where, 
apparently, ‘everyone was at it’. He did not enjoy school, truanted and was involved in 
petty crime. When he reached school leaving age, his father, with whom he did not ‘get 
on’, found him job on the building site where he (the father) worked, in an attempt to prise 
him away from the friends with whom he had been truanting and offending. However, he 
did not like the work and quickly went back to his friends who had by then moved on from 
‘selling a bit of weed’ to retailing larger quantities of cocaine.  
Similarly, Respondent G said he was ‘kicked out’ of secondary school and began 
‘hanging out’ with similarly disaffected friends. He said that the area in which he lived was 
notorious for crime and drug dealing and he knew many of the people involved in it.  
Respondent F who entered the interview room saying ‘I’m a criminal and I haven’t 
worked a day in my life’, said he didn’t like school and had only attended sporadically. He 
implied that he was offending when he was out of school. He said that he liked to be out 
of the classroom where he felt uncomfortable and ‘strange’ and preferred ‘doing things’. 
He said that he now regretted missing out on his education but when asked which 
educational courses he’d attended in the prison, it emerged that he had not attended any. 
Although he was not particularly forthcoming, it is reasonable to assume that he was 
offending from a fairly early age. The interviewers gained the impression that 
Respondent F was suffering from a, probably undiagnosed, learning difficulty.  
Respondent H came from a notorious OCG family in a notorious neighbourhood and said 
he was involved in a great deal of fighting at school because he was pushed by others to 
live up to the family name. His father insisted that he stay in school and he passed some 
GCSEs. Respondent H’s father died when he was 17 and he started drinking heavily and 
getting into fights and other petty crime. On another occasion he and a friend abducted a 
cocaine dealer and Respondent H was jailed for false imprisonment. Latterly he got 
drunk and crashed a car killing his friend. He was imprisoned for dangerous driving. Until 
the present five year sentence he had not been convicted for any major OCG-related 
offences. In this case he says he was trying to help a friend who was in debt to buy 9oz. 
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of heroin but because, as a member of a notorious OCG family, he was under constant 
surveillance by the police he was caught and prosecuted for Intent to Supply. 
Late Onset Criminality 
Respondent A, a property developer, was convicted of mortgage fraud involving 
hundreds of thousands of pounds at the age of 43, having had one previous fraud 
conviction in his mid-20s. He was a notorious gambler and had incurred large gambling 
debts. 
Respondent B was convicted for a first offence, laundering £800,000 worth of drugs 
money at the age of 52. He claimed that the money was given to him in payment for cars 
he would be supplying to the person who passed him the money. 
Respondent C was convicted of his first offence, Conspiracy to Supply Class A Drugs, at 
circa 45 years. He was in debt because his car repair business was failing and he 
claimed that a friend of his brother-in-law ‘threw him a lifeline’ by settling his debts and 
giving him some additional income in return for storing some boxes in his garage.  
Respondent D was convicted in 2009 for his first criminal offence, Drug Trafficking, at the 
age of 56. He was found guilty with 15 co-defendants and given the longest sentence (17 
years). He claimed that he was helping his brother-in-law out by delivering a van load of 
goods which, unbeknownst to him, had a very large stash of heroin under the 
floorboards. He said that he was a market trader.  
All but one of the late onset group were involved in the upper echelons of the illicit drugs 
trade; these were the people Respondent G (see below) described as ‘untouchable’ 
(although they clearly were not). It seems unlikely, particularly in the cases of 
Respondents B and D that they had not offended before, raising the question of how their 
offending could have gone undetected for so long.  
All of these respondents claimed to have been wrongly charged and imprisoned. 
Respondent A claimed to have been be wholly unaware of what a ‘bent’ business 
associate’s solicitor had done with money he was owed and claimed that he was ‘taking 
the rap’ just for trusting him. Respondent D cited gullibility and an unquestioning desire to 
help a family member, plus wrong advice from his QC. Respondent B also cited poor 
legal advice (he said he was ‘suing his brief’) and pressure from the Serious & Organised 
Crime Agency. Respondent C said that he had been insufficiently curious about the 
contents of the boxes he was asked to store. The other lower echelon respondents, by 
contrast, readily accepted that they had committed the crime for which they had been 
sentenced.  
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Familial Links into Organised Crime  
The father and other relatives of Respondent H had all been heavily involved in a variety 
of criminal enterprises and implicated in several murders and serious assaults. However, 
Respondent H appears to have been ‘the odd one out’ who was either unsuited to 
involvement in organised crime or prevented from being involved by his family. Yet his 
association with this criminal milieu meant that he was frequently involved in violence 
and, ironically, his criminality seems in part to have been a response to his exclusion 
from the family business and the stigma of being a family member.  
Respondent B left school at 16 and joined his father’s plant hire business. In the mid-
1990s his father, who appears to have been solidly embedded within the criminal 
community, was convicted for making ‘cash-in-hand’/’off-the-books’ payments and spent 
6 months in jail. Respondent B was a director of this company and branched out into the 
car leasing businesses, which may well have served as a front for class A drug dealing 
and money laundering (see above).  
As we have noted when Respondent C got into serious debt he was introduced by his 
brother-in-law to OCG nominals who could ‘help him out’.  
Respondent D claimed that he was not in fact a drug smuggler but had stumbled into the 
alleged conspiracy inadvertently because he was ‘helping out’ his brother-in-law. This 
help consisted of bringing a van containing unspecified goods from Holland where he 
said he was working at the time, although he later claimed that this main occupation was 
selling clothes in a street market in Liverpool.  
The Neighbourhood Effect 
Respondent E said that although he came from a good family, his neighbourhood was 
notorious for gangs, guns and drug-related crime and when he was growing up, most of 
his contemporaries were involved in some form of villainy. He denied that there was a 
gang problem in the area and said that it was just groups of friends getting together to 
make a bit of money. However, he acknowledged that there was what appeared to be 
gang conflict and spoke about a group with whom he and his friends were in conflict, who 
settled their differences by shooting people. He began using and dealing when he 
effectively dropped out of school. 
Respondent G said he came from a good family. His sister had attended university and 
his brothers were all working but when he was kicked out of school he began hanging out 
with similarly disaffected friends. He said that the area in which he lived was notorious for 
crime and drug dealing and that from a young age he knew, personally, many of the 
people who were involved in it.  
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While it is not inevitable that young men like these will become involved in crime in 
general and drug distribution in particular, the odds of this happening to disaffected 
young people in high crime, gang-affected, neighbourhoods are comparatively high. As 
Manuel Castells (1999) has observed, it is poorly educated, socially disadvantaged 
young people from high crime neighbourhoods who constitute ‘the shop floor’ of the 
international drugs trade. The area in which we conducted our Case Comparison Study 
exemplifies this situation, and it suggests that interventions that address the dynamics of 
the neighbourhood and the networks within it should run alongside interventions with 
particular individuals or families. 
Networks 
At his trial it emerged that respondent D was the kingpin in an extensive and highly 
ingenious drug trafficking network. He was also said to know and be on good terms with 
the main figures in organised crime in the North West. Yet he was also renowned locally 
for his charitable work and his commitment to the Catholic Church. 
Respondent E did not reveal where the cocaine he was being paid to transport came 
from because he wasn’t sure himself. It seemed that his role was to pick it up from 
someone he did not know and take it to somebody who came up from the south coast 
every week. He and a friend earned around £1,500 (£750 each) for this and Respondent 
E thought this was a ‘reasonable screw’ for not doing a great deal of work. He was 
involved in other deals but this appears to have been his main source of income. 
Respondent E was part of a network but he was not aware of the identities of most of the 
other people in it and he played only a minor role. Thus, while he was technically 
involved in a conspiracy, he was not a conspirator in the generally accepted sense of the 
term. Nonetheless, because of the large quantities of drugs being trafficked and the 
numbers of people involved in the network selling them, Respondent E was convicted of 
conspiracy to supply Class A drugs. 
Respondent G indicated that the people who were running the drugs business in his 
area, the ones making the biggest profits, were effectively ‘untouchable’. He said that 
they had legitimate businesses which served as a cover for the drugs trade; drove nice 
cars; had nice houses and nice holidays. He said that the police never seem able to ‘get 
anything on them’ and nobody ‘grasses them up’. He said that one of the reasons people 
get involved at the bottom end of the business (street dealing) is that they want to be like 
them but he had come to realise that this did not happen to people like him. This 
suggests that there is no career ladder reaching from the street to the ‘boardroom’ in the 
illicit drugs trade and that while ‘street people’ like him can achieve some seniority in 
terms of being the connection between this upper echelon of drug ‘wholesalers’ and 
street ‘retailers’ there is little or no scope for further progression. 
Respondent B, who both drove and leased nice cars, was an ostensibly law-abiding 
businessman. He spoke about colourful characters who hired top-end cars and that ‘all 
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sorts of people rent cars and you can’t know what all of them are up to’. In reality it 
seems that Respondent B had had extensive contact, both socially and professionally, 
with organised crime figures who were seriously involved in the production and trafficking 
of illicit drugs and money laundering.  
As Kleemans and de Poot (2008) suggest, these upper echelon OCG members like 
Respondents B and D tend to be involved in high value financial fraud/money laundering 
and/or cross-border transit crime (drug trafficking). Members of these groups tend to be 
specialists and membership changes over time depending on the skills and contacts 
necessary to facilitate the illicit enterprise in which they are involved. They describe 
themselves as businessmen, lead ostensibly conventional lives and endeavour to keep a 
low profile vis-à-vis criminal justice agencies.  
Respondents G and E by contrast were lower echelon ‘nominals’ from apparently 
successful, law-abiding, working class families. These were the children who felt they 
had ‘let their families down’; failed to meet their expectations and been excluded from, or 
dropped out of, school. As a result they ended up hanging out with their similarly 
disaffected peers in the high crime neighbourhoods in which they lived, using and selling 
drugs and eventually being drawn into storage and lower-level wholesale supply, possibly 
because, in one case, they became indebted to the upper echelon wholesalers/ 
traffickers.  
Their lifestyles tended to be chaotic partly because of drug use but also because they 
were estranged from their parents and law-abiding siblings who could have acted as a 
positive influence. Significantly perhaps, it does not appear that a great deal of effort was 
made by their school or social welfare agencies and criminal justice agencies to get 
either of them back into education or to achieve a rapprochement with their parents. 
Financial Problems 
Respondent A claimed that in 2008 as a result of the financial crash the value of his 
assets plummeted and his property company went bankrupt. He said that he was owed 
large sums of money and wanted to pay off debts (one of the largest was to a Casino). 
He therefore approached the solicitor of a well-known property developer with whom he 
had worked for £80,000 that he was owed. He claims not to have known that the property 
developer was raising multiple mortgages against properties, many of which he did not 
even own, and believes that because of his prior association with the man he was 
convicted of fraud.  
Respondent C said he leased a unit on an industrial estate where he did car repairs. He 
ran into debt and was eventually working 20 hours a day to ‘keep his head above water’. 
He claims to have had no previous convictions. He said that just as it looked as if he 
could not sustain his business any longer a friend of his brother-in-law ‘threw him a 
lifeline’. This lifeline consisted of this friend settling Respondent C’s debts and giving him 
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some additional income in return for storing boxes in his garage. Respondent C was 
remarkably incurious about the contents of the boxes but just grateful that his finances 
had been sorted out.  
Respondent G said that he and a team of five or six street dealers were turning over 
around £3,000 a day. However, because he was using a great deal of crack he ran up a 
debt of around £100,000. He was arrested for dealing and served a prison sentence, 
having done which, he was determined to go straight. However, the people to whom he 
owed money said that unless he worked off his debt by warehousing their drugs they 
would come after his family. He said he could not go to the police because that would 
have been too dangerous.  
Respondent H said that, in 2013, with Christmas looming, he realised that he needed to 
find a way of raising some money for Christmas presents etc. He contacted somebody 
involved in the illicit drug business and got a job delivering drugs in a van. He claimed to 
be earning £50 to £70 a day doing this, which seems a remarkably poor wage in the light 
of the hundreds and sometimes thousands of pounds relatively low-level operatives can 
earn for storing and transporting Class A drugs.  
Kleemans and de Poot (2008) found that involvement in organised crime, particularly late 
onset involvement, was often triggered by indebtedness. However, resolving debt 
problems in this way required contact with or knowledge of organised crime figures or 
some way of contacting them via a third party in their social network. Paradoxically, if 
debt is the driver of much late onset involvement in organised crime it could mean that 
the aggressive pursuit of funds through the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) could make 
further offending more likely. 
The Impact of Conviction and Imprisonment on Partners and Children 
Respondent A said he had a stable family and that he spoke to his nine year old son 
every day on the phone although he would not let him visit him in prison. He said his 
partner suffered from depression that was precipitated in part by the media coverage of 
his trial and the loss of their luxury home as a result of asset seizures. 
As a result of his involvement in the drugs trade, Respondent E became the target of 
some particularly dangerous people. He and his long-term girlfriend have a three year old 
daughter who became the subject of a child protection investigation because of the threat 
posed to the family. Respondent E and his partner cannot have custody of their daughter 
who is currently being fostered.  
Respondent C said that his conviction had cost him his good reputation because the 
press had presented him as someone at the centre of a ‘Crack Cocaine Empire’. He said 
he had lost the respect of friends and associates in the motor trade who now ‘put the 
phone down on him’. Respondent C’s house was seized under Proceeds of Crime Act 
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and his wife and child had to find alternative accommodation. At the same time their 
income dried up and they became reliant upon means-tested state benefits. When asked 
whether he had considered filing for bankruptcy when his debts became unmanageable, 
Respondent C said he did not because ‘you’ve got to support your bird ... your family’. It 
was as if he was saying ‘real men don’t go bankrupt - they tough it out’. 
The car in which Respondent F was being carried was found by the police to contain two 
sawn-off shotguns. Following this, Children’s Services had investigated to establish 
whether his children were at risk and they were placed with his mother. 
Respondent I had a wife and five children in the North West of England but was about to 
be deported to Jamaica leaving them unsupported. 
The impact of imprisonment upon the families and children of respondents was profound. 
For young respondents parenthood had caused them to re-evaluate their lives and 
rethink how they should behave now that they were responsible for a child. This was a 
particular challenge for those whose children had been removed from their care as a 
result of their actions and this would suggest that interventions aimed at trying to put the 
family back together again could be relevant and effective. 
Custody and After 
When Respondent B was asked whether he had seen the proverbial writing on the wall 
when he was the subject of death threats from people he had ‘grassed’, he said that he 
had never considered moving out of the area or into a different line of work. In saying that 
supplying prestige cars is all I know it was evident that he could not conceive of a life 
beyond the geographical area and cultural milieu in which he operated. 
Respondent C seemed to feel very bitter about the way he had been treated by the police 
and the Courts since, he implied, he had been duped and, in his view, had played only a 
very minor role in the Conspiracy to Supply Class A Drugs for which he was prosecuted. 
He said he would never get involved in crime again, noting that he should have been 
more suspicious when the friend of his brother-in-law had offered to settle his debts. He 
said, ruefully, that he had a minimum wage job lined-up with a car leasing company for 
when he was released. He said this involved persuading people leasing Mondeos to 
trade up to BMWs and ‘Mercs’. The researchers assumed that this was not one of the 
companies owned by Respondent B. 
Respondent E said that when he was young he had been a good boxer and was ‘mad 
about motorbikes’. He now feels that he should have stuck with the boxing and that if his 
interest in motorbikes could have been harnessed in some way things might have turned 
out differently. He hopes that when he gets out of prison he will secure a steady job. He 
is currently involved in a Network Rail training scheme and hopes to get a job at £800 per 
week working on the railway. This, he says, is about the same as he was earning from 
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drug dealing and does not bring the same risks. Having a job will, he hopes, enable him 
and his girlfriend to move to an area where he isn’t known to either the police or 
members of rival OCGs which will, he hopes, enable them to get back their daughter, 
who is currently being looked after by the local authority. He says that his family, who 
have nothing to do with crime, are now very supportive and will help him stay on the 
straight and narrow. He was always close to his mother he said, and appeared to have 
developed a better relationship with his father. He said that he has grown up in prison 
and can’t stand the thought of doing another sentence. He said that this meant he would 
have to avoid his old friends and associates because they could tempt him back into his 
old ways. 
When Respondent F came into the room saying ‘I’m a criminal and I haven’t worked a 
day in my life’ it was not clear whether this was merely an attempt to wind up the 
interviewers or whether he really was living the stereotype. It was certainly said 
aggressively. Asked about what plans he had for when he was released, he said he 
needed to get a job, although he seemed to have no idea what kind of job this might be. 
He said that if he couldn’t get a job he would probably go back to crime, because he was, 
as he said, ‘a criminal’. The researchers were left with the feeling that the latter was the 
most likely outcome. 
Respondent G said that he only got into trouble this time because he was under pressure 
to pay off a drug debt. He still owes money to the dealers whose drugs he was storing 
but despite police pressure he did not ‘grass’ on them. He said he did a deal with them 
wherein, in return for not grassing and spending four years in prison, the remainder of the 
debt would be regarded as paid. He also said that if they reneged on the agreement he, 
and presumably others, would come after their families, just as they had threatened to 
come after his. He said that growing up and having a daughter had changed his point of 
view and that when he leaves prison he will not be going back to his old neighbourhood 
and he will not lead a life which will put him at risk of imprisonment. 
Respondent H said that he had a partner who was sticking by him and two young 
children who he sees regularly and are ‘always asking after’ him. He says that having 
children has changed his attitude completely and he wants to be a good father to them. 
He has taken a course in Enhanced Thinking Skills while in jail and bought or rented a 
house outside the neighbourhood where he was brought up. He says that when he gets 
out he won’t allow his ‘old mates’ to come round to his house in order to reduce the 
temptations of his old life. He said he wanted to get a job but seemed vague about what 
that might be. He referred to ‘labouring on a building site or something’.  
Whereas the early onset group admitted their involvement in the offences for which they 
were imprisoned, the late onset group all denied or sought to minimise their culpability 
claiming, variously, that they were duped or poorly advised by their barristers. This might 
suggest that rehabilitative efforts would be better directed towards the early onset group. 
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The Systems Thinking Workshops and Key Informant 
Interviews 
The Systems Thinking Workshops programme consisted of 10 three-day events held in 
each of the local authority areas, attended by senior strategic and operational leads from 
voluntary, but predominantly statutory, organisations. 
This approach, utilising real life case studies, aims to identify and dismantle the barriers 
that prevent collaborative problem-solving by a plurality of agencies and organisations. At 
the end of the three days, attendees were asked to reflect on the actual and potential 
outcomes in the cases considered and how the functioning of their own agency might be 
shaped to facilitate more effective collaborative working. The workshops also aimed to 
illuminate the ways in which the OCG problem impacted upon the work of non-policing 
agencies and the kinds of interventions that might be made with actual and potential 
OCG members, their families, and/or entire OCG networks to prevent their involvement in 
crime or promote desistance from it.  
Members of the project team attended the first Systems Thinking Workshop in early 2014 
and attended and observed the last four, between February and April 2015. In addition, 
the team members undertook individual interviews with participants in the earlier 
Workshops. 
In all but one of the local authorities,1 two organised crime ‘nominals’ were identified and 
their life histories mapped against a timeline using the information presented by agency 
representatives. In almost all cases, because of the relevance of their families to their 
OCG involvement, the mapping included members of their immediate and, in some 
cases, extended families.  
The process usually started with the identification of the first known incident of criminal 
activity involving the identified ‘nominal’. The workshop then backtracked in order to 
garner any available information about the pre-crime risk factors evident between birth 
and the first recorded offence. Where available, and it often was not, information from 
education and social housing providers concerning behaviour, attendance, complaints 
from neighbours etc. was used to flesh out the nature of the vulnerabilities and threats 
presented by these families. 
Both the quality and quantity of the information shared varied from area to area and 
agency to agency. Some agencies did not feel it appropriate to share personal 
information that they believed to be irrelevant to the subject’s criminality. In other areas 
however there were frequent examples of apparently irrelevant information throwing light 
                                            
 
1 In one area the workshop focussed on a victim of organised crime and considered the impact of the 
criminality of that person and the local agencies. 
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upon previously unknown, but highly relevant information vis-à-vis OCG involvement. In 
one area, for example, a representative from ‘Health’ presented information about 
several visits to A&E made by a mother and child related to an OCG nominal because of 
injuries suffered by the child. This highlighted the fact that the children and partners of 
OGC nominals were sometimes frequent users of A&E in similar circumstances, 
suggesting that men whose profession is facilitated by violence seldom confine this 
violence to their criminal activity. The Children’s Services representative observed that if 
they had been aware of these A&E episodes and the father’s involvement in violent 
organised crime, their response would have been far more robust. 
Twenty interviews were conducted with key informants from a range of criminal justice 
and social welfare agencies operating in the conurbation, many of whom had participated 
in earlier Systems Thinking Workshops. In these interviews the project team aimed to 
gain an understanding of the impact of the Workshops on the thinking of personnel within 
the participating agencies.  
The Findings  
Information Sharing 
It was apparent in all of the workshops observed that, historically, most agencies, most of 
the time, had shared only the limited amount of information that they believed to be 
directly relevant to a particular case. It became clear, however, that sharing contextual 
information and family histories served to answer questions to which individual agencies 
had previously sought answers in vain. This, participants said, enabled them to think 
more clearly about the most appropriate foci for their interventions and the ‘minimum 
sufficient network’ of agencies and individuals necessary to facilitate them.  
In a number of the cases studied by participants, a wide range of interventions had been 
tried, and repeated, despite their apparent ineffectiveness. Even where there had been 
some ‘partnership working’, the situation had often got worse. It was difficult to identify 
precisely why these interventions had failed. While it was clear what concerns had 
triggered the interventions, the responses were often insufficiently robust and 
collaboration was obstructed by poor information sharing between areas and between 
agencies in the same area. 
One possible solution could be that information relating to OCG-involved families be held 
centrally and made accessible to the relevant agencies. This would, of course, raise the 
issue of how sensitive data was to be managed, particularly that relating to current 
offending behaviour. Such an initiative would require a clear information sharing protocol 
with sensitive information only shared on a need-to-know basis, via a central point.  
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The ‘deep dives’ in the local Workshops were achieved because of the willingness of 
participants to share information, although some concern was expressed about what the 
police and health services were prepared to share. However, some key informants 
expressed scepticism about whether this could be done in real time, although others with 
experience of the clean room (a multi agency meeting of professionals with decision-
making powers which, in many ways, replicated the Systems Thinking Workshops), 
suggested that this might be possible. 
Key informants suggested that the Workshops were, necessarily, post-crisis and to that 
extent, were more akin to serious case or domestic homicide reviews. While praising the 
thoroughness of the exercise they pointed to the irony that agencies were generally far 
more effective in sharing information after, rather than during, a critical event. 
Family Mapping and Separate Agency Assessments 
The process used in the workshops, of developing a timeline of events built around the 
identified individual and family was accepted to be useful. As this timeline was 
constructed a clearer picture of the wider family structure and the links between family 
members emerged. It also became apparent that, historically, no single agency or group 
of agencies had tried to map the family. Although the police mapped the OCG to which 
the nominal belonged, they did not map the extended family, yet doing this at the 
workshops yielded new and useful information about the nefarious activities of other 
family members and their links into OCGs, suggesting that this might usefully be done as 
a matter of course in real-time case management. 
It also appeared that it was common practice for separate agencies to each make 
assessments of the OCG-involved individuals or families without reference to one 
another. Thus, for example: 
 Children’s Services would make an assessment of the family’s parenting capacity 
 The Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC) Public Protection Team 
would make an assessment in the case of alleged or suspected domestic violence 
 The Police would make an assessment that supplemented the mapping under the 
Organised Crime Group Mapping protocol 
 Probation would assess the risks posed by the probationer 
Thus, at least four agencies would undertake an assessment of a high risk, potentially 
dangerous, individual and their family, none of which cross-referenced the others. Not 
only did this result in unnecessary and costly duplication but it also produced four 
parallel, but partial pictures of a family situation, the real dynamics of which could 
probably have been grasped if the agencies had collaborated. 
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The Early Years: The Role of Education and Pre-school 
In most of the workshops, early years information from schools tended to be sketchy or 
incomplete. Accepting that in many cases this information was very old and likely to have 
been archived or lost, in contemporaneous cases this should not have been the case. 
Where pre-school or school information was available, it was invariably significant and 
corroborated later patterns of behaviour. This indicates the importance of involving 
educators in multi-agency discussions about organised crime families. Something similar 
was achieved by a gangs initiative in the conurbation some 15 years before, and the 
results in terms of violence reduction and criminal desistance were remarkable. One 
head teacher interviewed by the project team clearly understood the nature and impact of 
organised crime in his area and had developed a robust system of pastoral care and 
oversight for children from OCG families attending his school. 
In one area where it was possible to analyse attendance, performance, and exclusion 
data provided by education, this information offered an insight into the impact of the 
behaviour and lifestyle of the parents upon their children and the school they attended. 
The children of the family were in need of extra support at school both to maximise their 
attainment and contain their anti-social behavior, particularly in relation to their violent 
behaviour in the playground. The emotional disruption caused when the parents left the 
children, apparently randomly, with family members and friends, exacerbated by their 
tiredness from being allowed to play out in the street till late in the evening also had a 
deleterious impact during the school day.  
Potentially, schools have an important role to play in identifying these vulnerable young 
people at an early age and working with them on the issues that assail them. However, 
unless they are working in conjunction with other professionals who are endeavouring to 
deal with the complex problems and vulnerabilities afflicting their families, and their 
criminality, it is difficult to see how these school-based interventions can succeed. In this 
case it was apparent that the interventions of the 29 agencies involved were more or less 
uncoordinated. The Workshop identified between 30 and 40 referrals made during the 
period under discussion but little action followed these referrals until, eventually, a crisis 
point was reached. When this happened, a family assessment was undertaken but 
without information from the many other agencies that had been intervening with the 
family. Given that these crises frequently manifest themselves at school, it may be that 
the school is the agency best placed to coordinate a joined-up response. However, this 
would require a rethink of the skills and resources schools might need to undertake this 
role.  
Sexual Violence at an Early Age 
A number of the cases presented at the workshops included incidents of sexual violence 
perpetrated against young people in OCG families in their early teens. Given the small 
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sample size it was hard to know how prevalent this was although findings from the Case 
Comparison Study suggest that it should be considered in family assessments. 
Domestic Abuse 
The Workshops revealed widespread domestic abuse, whether perpetrated by the OCG 
nominal or experienced by them as a routine part of his/her early life within the family.  In 
most cases the abuse was reported and later retracted. The withdrawal of the allegation 
or the failure of a prosecution appeared to mean that non-policing agencies were 
prepared to offer only very limited support to the victim. A MARAC may have been a 
better response, but may not have had sufficient focus on the behaviour of the 
perpetrator. 
In cases where there is an ongoing risk to a partner and/or the children, it would seem 
imperative that at the very least the option of a civil intervention should be considered, 
particularly if non-policing agencies can corroborate that such abuse is occurring. 
However, while on many occasions agencies were poised to act in such cases, the lack 
of a criminal prosecution appeared to stop them in their tracks.  
It seemed that victimised family members were seldom asked what they wanted to 
happen next and what might make things better. Nor was the perpetrator asked what 
might make them stop committing these offences. Yet, a multi-agency intervention akin to 
that developed by Operation Ceasefire in Boston in which the offer of support to end 
abusive behaviour was linked with the promise of robust enforcement or a controlling civil 
intervention if the offence was repeated could represent an innovative and potentially 
successful response to an apparently intractable problem. 
The comparative quantitative data gathered and the information supplied in the 
Workshops, as well as the observations of key informants suggest that domestic abuse is 
particularly prevalent in families associated with OCGs. Respondents identified the 
incidence of domestic abuse in the majority of the cases analysed in the Systems 
Thinking Workshops. In the Workshops in which the project team participated, the 
incidents of domestic abuse directed at partners and children was widespread and 
frequent throughout the extended family. Where it was reported to the responsible 
agencies it was rarely prosecuted because these complaints, made on impulse, were 
usually withdrawn. The evidence we gathered suggests that domestic violence in OCG-
associated families is a risk factor which portends future criminal involvement for the 
children of that family. How this differs from the impact of domestic abuse in non-OCG 
and ostensibly non-offending families is difficult to assess. 
The Role of the Criminal Justice System as a Trigger for Intervention 
In all the observed Workshops social intervention in cases of domestic abuse and sexual 
violence appeared to be contingent upon criminal justice involvement. In one area, 
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allegations of intra-familial sexual violence were being investigated by the police but were 
retracted by the young victim and were not therefore pursued through the criminal justice 
system. However, information about the allegation was not passed on to the Youth 
Offending Service so no interventions were developed to address the consequences of 
sexual violence. It seemed that criminal justice, social welfare, and safeguarding 
agencies were operating in quite distinct spheres, seldom communicating with each 
other.  
In another area a series of interventions were developed during the early criminal career 
of the person concerned even though their success appeared limited. These 
interventions aimed to change specific behaviours but were abandoned when a criminal 
conviction was not obtained because their focus was the particular offence rather than 
their behaviour in its social context. Problem solving interventions were stifled because of 
the need for the police to achieve a positive criminal justice outcome. Thus pre-emptive 
measures to reduce risk of harm were put on hold and information was not shared with 
agencies with the capacity to ameliorate the situation. 
Where criminal prosecution was not possible there seemed to be no consideration of how 
the information obtained could support a purposeful civil intervention to address and 
change the behaviour and lifestyle that led to the offending behaviour. 
Lack of Inter Agency Understanding 
The need for a key worker or professional who could understand and manage all the 
issues raised during the review of cases was clear. In Police terms this would be a Lead 
Responsible Officer but it could just as well be a professional from any agency who had 
the professionalism and authority to question, hold to account, and challenge the 
activities of partner agencies without fear or favour. We have described this person as a 
meta professional. This person could also be the guardian of the intelligence and 
information held on the family concerned.  
Thresholding 
Agency thresholds also limited their ability to act. Assessments undertaken by single 
agencies in response to particular problems often failed to reach the threshold for 
intervention. However, when information from several agencies was collated the case for 
intervention often became far stronger. All too often, however, families were referred on 
from agency to agency, each of which focused on only one aspect of the problem and 
each of which could be more easily manipulated by the family as a result. This was an 
approach which maximized professional effort while minimizing a positive impact. 
A multi-agency approach to planning and intervention would be more effective in terms of 
its impact on behaviour and lifestyle and far more cost effective. This could be achieved if 
each of the partners had a clear understanding of which aspects of the problem they 
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were best equipped to address; their respective powers and responsibilities and the 
benefits, both professional and fiscal, that they would gain by virtue of their involvement 
in the partnership. However, research shows that if the problem to be solved or the 
benefits to be gained from joining a problem-solving partnership are not obvious to 
potential partners, a champion with a new narrative, which identifies the scale and nature 
of the problem and its likely impact upon the agencies and their clientele, as well as 
access to the places where decisions are made, is imperative (van Staden et. al. 2011). 
Key informants echoed the concerns of Workshop participants about thresholding. Put 
simply, it appears that while, on the basis of limited information, agencies conclude that 
something should be done, their information may suggest that the seriousness of the 
problem does not meet the threshold requirements. When information is gathered from a 
plurality of agencies, however, it often appears that the problem does meet and indeed 
surpass that threshold. In one area the agencies established a triage system where 
cases were assessed in terms of risk and harm. However, although this appeared to offer 
a practical management solution, it was not systemic and so suffered from the same 
problems as a sole agency assessment.  
In another area, cases were referred to a ‘clean room’ (see above). The clean 
roomapproach had not been used to focus upon organised crime groups, being primarily 
concerned with families with complex needs or high dependencies. However, this was 
proving a beneficial approach with positive outcomes for the referred families. Further 
analysis was being undertaken to ascertain the ongoing impact on agency demand and 
to identify whether the high demand these families had previously shown was being 
displaced to other public agencies. 
Fear of Engagement 
Two key informants suggested that for some professionals, and their agencies, the 
prospect of direct face-to-face intervention with individuals involved in organised and 
violent crime was frightening. This was in part a fear about the risks involved in dealing 
with a known offender, with a reputation for violence, but there was also a concern that 
such intervention might precipitate a backlash against the agency. They noted that 
several of the people who featured in the case studies were serial complainers, and the 
professionals and agencies wished to avoid the extra work and risk to their reputations 
that complaints bring with them. On the other hand, of course, these professionals and 
agencies were under ever greater pressure from government to intervene pre-emptively 
to prevent abuse and neglect.  
Avoidance Techniques 
Key informants noted that many of the families analysed at the Workshops had 
developed ingenious ways of avoiding contact with public agencies, one of which, as we 
have noted, was serial complaining. Another was to use A&E services rather than the 
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family GP on the assumption that by doing so patterns of injury were less likely to be 
spotted and reported to Children’s Services. This desire to avoid contact with the public 
services was picked up by the children and this behaviour was in turn replicated by them. 
More typically, they would avoid visits from social workers and undermine social work 
interventions. Avoidance techniques, when effectively deployed, could lead agencies to 
hold an overly optimistic view, wherein individuals were given every chance to change 
their behaviour without being effectively challenged or held to account. This phenomenon 
was not remarked upon in all of the Workshops. 
The Costs of Managing OCG-involved Families 
In one Workshop, although it was difficult to collate all the information available for the 
family of six children, a mother, a father, a new partner and the paternal and maternal 
grandparents, the analysis identified the fact that 29 agencies had been involved with this 
family between 2006 and 2015. The estimated cost of this involvement was between 
£4,000,000 and £6,000,000. This estimate did not take into account the economic impact 
on both housing associations and private landlords who were unable to let properties in 
the vicinity of the family home. Moreover, the huge sums spent on this family over the 
period seem to have produced few tangible results in terms of behavioural and lifestyle 
changes. 
There were also unintended outcomes of well-intentioned interventions which ended up 
incurring even greater costs. One family was eventually evicted from a housing 
association property on the basis of painstakingly gathered evidence of breaches of the 
tenancy agreement. This was a costly and time-consuming process yet, having been 
evicted, the family was rendered officially homeless. As a result, they were rehoused in a 
privately rented house three doors away from where they had previously lived and the 
mayhem continued.  
The Role of Organised Crime Group Mapping (OCGM) 
Most Workshop respondents felt that, at present, the OCGM, did not facilitate the 
targeting of OCG nominals or inform partners about the level of threat they posed. There 
was some acceptance that the OCGM could have a role in assessing risk, threat, and 
capability and, as such, could be one of a basket of indicators that assessed 
performance and outcomes.   
Support for the OCGM was strongest amongst respondents from the police service who 
believed it was a potentially important tool. Other partners thought that they might have 
information that could support an enhancement of the OCGM through processes that 
enable partnership information, insight, and data to be shared. They acknowledged that 
when information from a wide range of agencies was pooled, a much clearer picture of 
risk, threat, and harm was achieved.   
37 
 
The challenge for the OCGM, particularly as there is currently no national drive to extend 
its information gathering remit, is to develop a system that allows for information to be 
collected and stored systematically to give an enhanced view of risk, threat, and harm, 
without having to undertake a deep dive information sharing process in all cases. 
One clear example of the limitation of the OCGM if the information it uses comes from 
only one source was highlighted at a Workshop where the case study presented by the 
police was of an individual mapped as an OCG nominal. However, there had been no 
attempt to widen the scope of their assessment beyond his criminal associates. Yet, as 
his family was mapped with the help of other agency representatives, other dimensions 
of the threat he posed, and the potential risks to and threats posed by his family, became 
clear. Taken together with this additional information about his behaviour and lifestyle 
from non-policing sources, a much richer picture of the scale and nature of his offending 
emerged. 
Recommendations  
The Focus of Intervention 
A distinctive feature of the criminal careers and familial cultures of lower echelon OCG 
members is the use of violence as a problem solving technique. Family violence is a 
major concern for all the non-policing agencies that might form a multi-agency alliance 
and the prevention of family violence could be a shared objective to which they could all 
subscribe. This would suggest that a major focus of multi-agency intervention would be 
violence reduction through prevention and enforcement.  
There is a paradox here however because while the women in OCG-involved families are 
likely to experience domestic violence and sometimes be the victims of retribution from 
their partners adversaries, they are also powerful figures in these families and 
neighbourhoods who can, if they wish, both prevent and promote desistance from 
involvement in crime amongst their children and their partners. This would suggest that 
professional intervention with these women would play a central role in any such 
initiative.  
The development of methods of measuring the incidents of violence perpetrated by and 
against the targeted families would offer a reliable indication of effectiveness. It would be 
crucial, however, that the intervention was tightly focussed upon particular children, 
families, and youth groups, as was the successful gang strategy developed previously. 
Thus everybody in the partnership should understand the goals they are pursuing, which 
aspects of the problem they are best equipped to address, their respective powers and 
responsibilities, the role/s they would play in the team and the benefits, both professional 
and fiscal, they would gain from involvement. For such an initiative to work, however, a 
mechanism for effective information sharing would need to be developed. 
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Information Sharing 
As we have noted, the clean room is an approach to the sharing and evaluation of 
information adopted in several local partnership Hubs in the conurbation. The initial focus 
of clean room evaluations is the individual, their social circumstances, and their family 
relationships, the risks to which they are exposed and the harms they might generate. 
This approach involves co-ordinating information held by partner agencies in order to 
intervene pre-emptively to forestall exploitation, abuse, and criminal victimisation. Thus, 
partners are involved prior to any intervention thresholds being met and are able to 
consider all options for intervention including civil measures. We would therefore 
recommend that this model be promoted and facilitated in each of the local authorities 
within the conurbation working with dynastic crime families.  
Co-location  
Information sharing is key to addressing serious and organised crime and information 
sharing is enhanced significantly in co-located and/or integrated teams which is 
increasingly the model adopted in child protection. We would therefore recommend that 
in areas where dynastic crime families are prevalent, co-located multi-agency hubs be 
established to develop preventive and pre-emptive interventions. 
Meta Professionalism  
The reconfiguration of public services and the increasing co-location and integration of 
professionls from different agencies and disciplines presents many challenges, 
particularly in terms of ensuring serious and organised crime is prioritised. Workshop 
participants and key informants, some of whom had developed multi-agency hubs, 
identified a need for those with lead responsibility to gain an understanding of the roles 
and responsibilities of the participating agencies and how joint work might best be 
facilitated. Ideally the appointee would bring experience in and knowledge of a range of 
agencies and, in particular, an understanding of their cultures, structures, discourses and 
priorities. Crucialy, they would have the ability to challenge single agency decisions if it 
was felt they did not reflect the overall objectives of the participating agencies.  
We would therefore recommend that such a meta-professional be appointed to each of 
the hubs and that the employing authority institute appropriate training with particular 
references to families whose members are involved in OGCs, and that independent 
professional supervision be made available to support the incumbent and enable them to 
develop their role in the light of local circumstances. 
The Locus of Intervention 
If the initiative is to counter the forces supportive of violent organised crime in the area it 
would need a presence both actual and psychological in the targeted neighbourhoods 
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because professionals would need to connect with, and exert influence within, both the 
professional and the informal networks therein. This would indicate the need for an 
outreach function which might well involve mentors and/or parents from families targeted 
by the initiative. We would therefore recommend that alongside the family interventions 
undertaken by the co-located hub commended above, team members develop 
interventions in the neighbourhood to reduce levels of violence and intimidation in the 
area.  
The development of an anti-violence counter-narrative within the targeted neighbourhood 
is now being pioneered in UK counter terrorism initiatives and might usefully be adopted 
in these kinds of high crime, violent, neighbourhoods.  
Policy Development at a Local Level 
To mount an effective multi-agency intervention to prevent involvement in, and limit the 
impact of, organised crime there is a need for the establishment of a multi-agency 
alliance. This would require a commitment from the heads of all the relevant services to 
ring-fence, in terms of funding and staffing, a sustained multi-agency intervention in 
OCG-affected neighbourhoods. Any such multi-agency intervention should be based on 
joint commissioning. Staff should be actually (occasionally virtually) co-located and 
formally linked to key personnel in relevant national agencies (e.g. the National Crime 
Agency, the Borders Agency and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC)). OCG 
mapping in the area should therefore become a responsibility of the whole partnership. 
The intervention should be overseen by a steering group of senior stakeholders from the 
relevant agencies. Clear success criteria should be agreed and monitoring and 
evaluation should be built into the intervention from the outset as a steering mechanism. 
On the ground, the initiative would be led by a meta-professional with an understanding 
of the cultures, structures, discourses and priorities of all the participating agencies in the 
alliance.  
Policy Development at a National Level 
The Organised Crime Group, Cross Government Strategy. Local Practitioner Guidance 
(Home Office, 2014) indicates how a local problem profile might be developed and the 
roles that the agency partners might play. However, the Guidance is already outdated 
vis-à-vis the reconfiguration of OCG services within the Police, Regional OCG units, and 
the National Crime Agency. We would therefore recommend that the Strategy be revised 
to take account of recent developments and that efforts to establish OCG Problem 
Profiling with partner agencies should begin with an explanation of the nature, scope and 
impact of organised crime in their area, the characteristic behaviours and lifestyles of 
OCG nominals and their families, and the roles the various agencies might play in 
reducing risk to their clients. This would aid the development of local OCG hubs. 
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A major flaw with OCGM identified in this research is the haphazard nature of information 
sharing between law enforcement and partner agencies. This is due in part to uncertainty 
about what partners believe might be relevant and their interpretation of what current 
information sharing legislation allows. This suggests a need for guidance on the 
relevance of information sharing, what can be shared legally, and how the client’s rights 
can be safeguarded.  
Currently, police and agency partners appear to find the OCGM largely irrelevant to their 
day-to-day practice which further reinforces the need for the development of a systematic 
approach to information sharing which is understood and agreed by the relevant agency 
partners.  
Legislative Innovation 
At present, asset seizures are cumbersome to implement and sometimes devastating for 
the families of offenders when they are successful. We would therefore recommend the 
development of provisional and partial asset seizures wherein some assets are seized 
but the subject is allowed to retain some of the more equivocal assets as long as they 
desist from further criminal involvement.  
In the prison interviews it emerged that beside imprisonment itself, the greatest blow for 
these offenders was the seizure of assets because it often had devastating effects on 
partners and children. We would therefore recommend that in the cases of late onset, 
upper echelon, OCG Members, Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) applications, an 
arrangement be made with the nominal that the application is partially deferred or 
suspended. Such a suspension would fall short of allowing criminals to gain significantly 
from their illegal activity but would not be so draconian that their only option is to continue 
in a life of crime.  
The logical extension of a non-policing element in an organised crime intervention would 
be that civil measures be developed to deter people from involvement in organised crime 
or to promote desistance from it. We would therefore recommend the development of a 
type of an Organised Crime Banning Order (OCBO) similar to the ‘Gangbo’ devised by 
the present authors, which would provide support, but the breach of which would incur a 
criminal sanction. 
The Categorisation of OCG Prisoners 
Respondents expressed concern about the ease with which prisoners who have been 
involved in serious and organised crime can progress from secure prison establishments 
to those with open conditions. This has sometimes allowed them to re-establish contact 
with former associates and become involved, albeit vicariously, in further offending. We 
would therefore recommend that the officer who leads the organised crime group 
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mapping process should have greater involvement in decisions about the prisoner’s 
trajectory through the prison system and their categorisation.  
Pre-release Planning for OCG Prisoners  
Pre-release planning for prisoners who have been involved in serious and organised 
crime seldom gathers information from agency partners in the areas to which they are 
returning and the Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) is seldom used 
to manage these prisoners upon release. We would therefore recommend that before 
their release the lead OCG mapping officer, the relevant local agencies and the MAPPA 
are consulted about the nature and level of the supervision and surveillance that will 
need to be put in place on release.  
The Release of Late Onset, Upper Echelon, OCG Members 
The criminal careers of late onset, upper echelon, OCG members are distinctive. It is 
more difficult to identify members of this group prior to their involvement in organised 
crime since many of them have led ostensibly conventional law-abiding lives before their 
involvement with OCGs. 
The main driver of offending amongst this group is money, to pay off debts, sustain an 
opulent lifestyle, or both. Unlike the subjects of our Case Control Study, these offenders 
are involved in a broad range of offences, ranging from drugs and human trafficking to 
cybercrime and manufacture of counterfeit goods. As a result, prevention and 
intervention is more difficult because of a paucity of information and intelligence. 
Development of relevant intelligence concerning debts accrued as a result of involvement 
in the illicit drugs trade should be considered in the prison release planning stage. 
However, collaborative working between relevant national and local agencies, like Work 
& Pensions and HMRC, with local housing providers and Children’s Services, can 
maximise information sharing and make for a remarkably effective intervention with OCG 
members.  
Clearly, pre-emptive family intervention with the late onset group would be difficult, but in 
the case of dynastic crime families who are well known to many public agencies this is 
not the case and, as the Systems Thinking Workshops revealed, despite the skill some 
families display in avoiding contact with the public authorities, when information is 
pooled, previously unimagined opportunities for preventive intervention present 
themselves.   
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